DOE Assistant Secretary Anne White Resigns

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Gilbertson Reassigned

In June 2019, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced that Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) Anne White had submitted her resignation.  White’s resignation, which was detailed in a department announcement signed off with the names of Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and the Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Brouillette, became effective on June 14, 2019.


DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management  The DOE memo does not provide a reason for White’s resignation.  “Anne’s service to the Department of Energy and to this nation are greatly appreciated,” the personnel announcement reportedly reads.  “Please join us in wishing her the best in her future endeavors.”

However, reports indicate that White was asked to resign by her immediate supervisor, Undersecretary of Energy for Science Paul Dabbar.  In addition to friction with Dabbar, her departure was linked to concerns about her handling of the spread of radioactive contamination from the Portsmouth Site in Ohio to the surrounding area.  Last month, a middle school near the site closed early for summer due to reported radiological contaminants in air samples.  DOE says that its own air monitoring has shown only trace amounts of contaminants including neptunium-237 and americium-241 that are far below being a risk to human health.  Nonetheless, the Department has agreed to pay for extra air sampling this summer by an outside consultant.

DOE’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management  Mark Gilbertson, who is currently DOE’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, has also been reassigned.  According to the DOE memo, Gilbertson will become the Director of the Department’s National Laboratory Operations Board.  The Board works to strengthen DOE’s national labs and their shared relationships.

Todd Shrader, the Manager of Environmental Management’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Carlsbad Field Office, will replace Gilbertson as the EM Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, according to the memo.

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Management  William “Ike” White, the Chief of Staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), will now serve as a Senior Advisor to DOE Under Secretary for Science Paul Dabbar.  Among other things, Dabbar oversees environmental- and legacy-management missions.

The NNSA is in charge of the nation’s nuclear complex and related nonproliferation.  Late last month, William Bookless was sworn in as the NNSA’s Principal Deputy Administrator.


Environmental Management, established in 1989, is charged with cleaning up the nation’s legacy from the Cold War and other government-sponsored energy research.  On January 3, 2018, the White House announced President Donald J. Trump’s intent to nominate White to be the EM Assistant Secretary.  On March 22, 2018, White was confirmed for the position by voice vote of the U.S. Senate.  White was sworn in on March 29, 2018.

Prior to White’s swearing-in, James Owendoff had been serving as the Acting EM-1 Assistant Secretary.  In this role, Owendoff focused on more timely decisions on cleanup projects.  The position was previously held by Monica Regalbuto at the end of the administration of former-President Barack Obama.

For additional information about the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Disposal, please go to

The 2018 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

In October 2018, The 2018 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report (2018 Task Force Report) was submitted to the President and the U.S. Congress by the Chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as required under Public Law 109-58, The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Energy Policy Act).


Like the reports that precede it, the 2018 Task Force Report includes a discussion of accomplishments of the Interagency Task Force on Radiation Source Protection and Security (Task Force) and its member agencies over the past four years, as well as the status of actions underway by the Task Force to provide further assurance of the security of sources in all stages of their life cycle.

In preparation for this report, the Task Force evaluated the specific topics identified in the Energy Policy Act, including the list of radioactive sources that warrant enhanced protection; mechanisms for the safe storage and ultimate disposal of radioactive sources; transportation security; source tracking; import and export; and, ways to facilitate the use of alternative technologies to replace radioactive sources, as appropriate.  Based on its evaluation, the Task Force concluded that there are no significant gaps in the area of radioactive source protection and security that are not already being addressed through continued attention by appropriate Task Force agencies. Nonetheless, the Task Force remains engaged in activities to address ongoing challenges involving end-of-life management of risk-significant sources.

During this report cycle, the Task Force completed four recommendations from previous reports, which leaves only seven ongoing recommendations from the 2006, 2010, and 2014 reports.  In addition, the Task Force stated that it has completed several important accomplishments over the course of the past 4 years.  These include:

  • The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) completed the “Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low-Level Radioactive Waste and GTCC-Like Waste” (Final EIS) and submitted the Report to Congress identifying and describing the alternatives under consideration for the disposal of Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste, as required by Section 631 of the Energy Policy Act.  Although the Final EIS and Report to Congress do not constitute a final decision on disposal of GTCC low-level radioactive waste, their completion represents a major accomplishment in progress toward establishing a disposal pathway for certain risk-significant radioactive sources.
  • The NRC issued certificates of compliance to DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for two new transportation packages — the Model 435-B container in 2014 and the Model 380-B container in 2017.  Together, the new containers will help to enable shipment of nearly all commercially used devices containing high-activity cobalt-60 and cesium-137 radioactive sealed sources.
  • The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Interagency Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radioactive Sources completed its best practices guide for federal agencies.  The guide provides measures that federal agencies can consider to facilitate the transition to alternative technologies in their long-term strategic planning in a way that meets technical, operational and cost requirements.
  • The United States continued to elevate the international radioactive source safety and security framework.  For example, the U.S. continues to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to encourage member states to make a political commitment to act in accordance with the IAEA “Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources” that was issued in March 2005 and updated in May 2012.  In addition, the U.S. was instrumental in finalizing supplementary guidance to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, “Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources,” which was issued in April 2018.

The Task Force continues to focus on actions to advance end-of-life management for risk- significant radioactive sources through efforts to establish expanded disposal capability and to identify opportunities to leverage best practices for the management of sources once they become disused.  The Task Force also continues to focus on efforts to advance the research, development and use of alternative technologies to replace radioactive sources, as appropriate, as well as to coordinate strategies to enhance the protection of radioactive sources from potential cyber security threats.  These actions will provide an enhanced level of protection and security for risk-significant sources, beyond the regulations currently in place.


During this report cycle, the 2018 Task Force completed four of the 11 recommendations and actions that remained in process at the start of this reporting period and concluded that there are no significant gaps in radioactive source protection and security that are not already being addressed.  However, the Task Force continues to focus on end-of-life management of risk-significant sources.  The Task Force will continue to advance its efforts to complete the remaining seven recommendations and actions and will coordinate routinely to identify and mitigate any gaps in source protection and security that may emerge in the future.

Consistent with the Energy Policy Act, the Task Force has continued its efforts to evaluate the security of radioactive sources and make related recommendations to the President and Congress.  The 2018 Task Force Report states that the Task Force has made substantial progress since the events of September 11, 2001 to enhance the protection of radioactive sources from terrorist threats and concludes that the United States is well positioned to continue to protect public health and safety and promote the common defense and security through the existing missions and activities of Task Force member agencies.


The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established the Task Force to evaluate and provide recommendations to the President and Congress relating to the security of radioactive sources in the United States from potential terrorist threats.  These threats include acts of sabotage, theft or use of a radioactive source in a radiological dispersal device or radiation exposure device.  The Task Force presented its initial report to the President and Congress in 2006 and has continued to provide reports every four years consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

Fourteen federal agencies and one industry organization participate on the Task Force.  Members of the Task Force as mandated by the Energy Policy Act include the NRC Chair, Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Transportation, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Other invited departments, offices and organizations include the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Science and Technology Policy and Organization of Agreement States (OAS) — the latter of which is a non-voting member.

The 2018 Task Force report is divided into three chapters that detail advances in the security and control of radioactive sources; the status of the recovery and disposition of radioactive sealed sources; and, progress in the area of alternative technologies. The 2018 Task Force Report states that, collectively, these chapters substantiate the Task Force’s conclusion that substantial progress has been made since the events of September 11, 2001 to enhance the protection of radioactive sources from terrorist threats, as well as that there are no significant gaps in the area of radioactive source protection and security that are not already being addressed through continued attention by the appropriate Task Force agencies.

In September 2011, at the request of the NNSA/GTRI, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum (LLW Forum) Forum formed the Disused Sources Working Group (DSWG).  The working group, which was comprised of eight Directors of the LLW Forum, solicited input from a broad range of stakeholders at 19 meetings over a 30-month period.  In March 2014, the DSWG released its report identifying findings and recommendations related to the management and disposition of disused sealed sources that pose a threat to national security.

A PDF copy of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum’s Disused Sources Working Group report may be downloaded and printed from the organization’s web site at or the National Directory of Brokers and Processors web site at

Background information on the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force report, as well as links to the 2006 and 2010 reports, can be found on the NRC’s web site at

National Defense Authorization Act Continues NNSA Program re Voluntary Phasing Out of Cesium Chloride Blood Irradiation Devices

On August 13, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law No. 115-232).  Amongst other things, the law directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to continue working toward the voluntary phasing out of the use of blood irradiation devices in the United States that rely on cesium chloride by December 31, 2027.

The law authorizes the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to continue its current program to pay up to 50% of the per-device replacement costs and 100% of the disposition costs.  The law includes specified reporting requirements about the program to Congress.

The relevant text is as follows:


(a)  Goal.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall ensure that the goal of the covered programs is eliminating the use of blood irradiation devices in the United States that rely on cesium chloride by December 31, 2027.

(b)  Implementation.—To meet the goal specified by subsection (a), the Administrator shall carry out the covered programs in a manner that—

(1) is voluntary for owners of blood irradiation devices;

(2) allows for the United States, subject to the review of the Administrator, to pay up to 50 percent of the per-device cost of replacing blood irradiation devices covered by the programs;

(3) allows for the United States to pay up to 100 percent of the cost of removing and disposing of cesium sources retired from service by the programs; and

(4) replaces such devices with x-ray irradiation devices or other devices approved by the Food and Drug Administration that provide significant threat reduction as compared to cesium chloride irradiators.

(c)  Duration.—The Administrator shall carry out the covered programs until December 31, 2027.

(d)  Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the covered programs, including—

(1) identification of each cesium chloride blood irradiation device in the United States, including the number, general location, and user type;

(2) a plan for achieving the goal established by subsection (a);

(3) a methodology for prioritizing replacement of such devices that takes into account irradiator age and prior material security initiatives;

(4) in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, a strategy identifying any legislative, regulatory, or other measures necessary to constrain the introduction of new cesium chloride blood irradiation devices;

(5) identification of the annual funds required to meet the goal established by subsection (a); and

(6) a description of the disposal path for cesium chloride sources under the covered programs.

(e)  Assessment.—The Administrator shall submit an assessment to the appropriate congressional committees by September 20, 2023, of the results of the actions on the covered programs under this section, including—

(1) the number of replacement irradiators under the covered programs;

(2) the life-cycle costs of the programs, including personnel training, maintenance, and replacement costs for new irradiation devices;

(3) the cost-effectiveness of the covered programs;

(4) an analysis of the effectiveness of the new irradiation devices’ technology; and

(5) a forecast of whether the Administrator will meet the goal established in subsection (a).

(f)  Definitions.—In this section:

(1)  APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate.

(2) COVERED PROGRAMS.—The term “covered programs” means the following programs of the Office of Radiological Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration:

(A) The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program.

(B) The Off-Site Source Recovery Program.

For additional information, please see the following link to the bill:

Texas Compact Commission Holds Low-Level Waste Disposal Workshop

On November 15, 2017, the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Commission (TLLRWDCC) hosted a workshop in Austin, Texas.  The workshop, which was held at the Legislative Conference Center at the Texas State Capitol, was a full-day event.

Workshop presentations focused on disposal options for in-compact waste generators, specifically on topics that are important to Texas generators.  The meeting agenda included the following:

  • 9:00 – 9:30: Welcome and Program Introduction — TLLRWDCC
  • 9:30 – 10:00: Why is Source Disposal So Important? — National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
  • 10:00 – 10:30: Superfund!  No One is Immune — Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
  • 10:45 – 11:45: Source Storage and the 2-Year Rule — Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS)
  • 1:15 – 1:45: How Can I Dispose of My Source?  The Source Collection and Threat Reduction (SCATR) Program — Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD)
  • 1:45 – 2:15: What is a Low-Level Waste Compact?  How does a Compact Affect Me? — TLLRWDCC
  • 2:30 – 3:15: Does Texas Have a Compact Facility?  And Why Do I Care? — Waste Control Specialists (WCS)
  • 3:15 – 3:45: The Role of the TCEQ — TCEQ
  • 3:45 – 4:00: Closing Remarks — TLLRWDCC

Attendance for the workshop, for which there were 70 slots available, was free.

For additional information, please contact Texas Compact Commission Executive Director Leigh Ing at (512) 305-8941 or at